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THE SPIRIT VERSUS THE LETTER
MADALINE KINTER REMMLEIN *

The social and educational impact of the decision of the
Supreme Court of the United States in the public school segregation cases 1 has been reviewed in the literature. 2 The social and
educational effects of the decision are of utmost importance and
the efficacy of the Court's pronouncement will depend in large part
upon the solution of these practical problems looming so large in
the minds of all of us. Nevertheless, this author feels that lawyers
are interested also in certain features of the decision that are
peculiarly pertinent in the practice of law, apart from the subject
matter of the decision.
EFFECT OF INTENT, IF DISCERNABLE

The Court asked counsel to compile evidence, if any exists,
that the Congress which submitted and the states which ratified the
Fourteenth Amendment contemplated that it would or would not
abolish segregation in the public schools. In this request was embodied the implication that the Court would be influenced by the
intent, if it could be ascertained.
Attorneys arguing in favor of segregation concluded that the
objective of the Amendment was to guarantee certain basic rights
to the Negro, but that, in the words of the attorney general for
the State of Kansas, "the right to mingle with other races in the
public schools" was not included in this concept of basic rights.
Furthermore, it was argued it could not be said that the states
ratifying the Amendment understood that it would abolish segregation in the public schools, since the majority of these states
authorized segregation at the time the Amendment was ratified.
Attorneys arguing against segregation concluded that the Thirtyninth Congress which proposed the Fourteenth Amendment and
the states that ratified it intended the Amendment to make no
distinctions between the races. Both sides relied upon the record
of debates among members of Congress, skimming over the fact
that records of discussions within the states are meager, if not
entirely lacking.
The question was faced squarely in the briefs filed by the
United States Department of Justice. When the Thirty-ninth Congress had the Amendment under consideration, those for it and
those against it understood that the Amendment would have broad
*Assistant Director, Research Division, National Education Association,
Lecturer in School Law,- The George Washington University, Member of the District of Columbia Bar, Member of the Supreme Court of the United States Bar.
I Brown v. Board of Education, Briggs v. Elliott, Davis v. County School
Board, Gebhart v. Belton, 74 S. Ct. 686; Bolling v. Sharpe, 74 S. Ct. 693; Docket
Nos. 1, 2, 3, 4, and 5, October 1954 Term.
2E.g., "Next Steps in Racial Desegregation in Education," Journal of Negro
Education Yearbook Number, Summer 1954. Vol. XXIII, No. 3. 399 p.; Journal
of Public Law, Vol. 3, No. 1. Emory University Law School, 'Emory University,
Georgia, Spring 1954.
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implications; but, both sides mentioned only a few examples, not
including the public schools. Records to indicate the understanding
of the states are incomplete; where such records exist, there are
almost no references to the public schools, and the Department of
Justice concluded that possibly the state legislators "were unaware
that the Amendment had a bearing on education even to the extent of requiring equal though separate schools."
Soon after the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment, Congress debated proposed legislation on civil rights. Some of those
who opposed the bill mentioned that, if enacted, it would have an
effect on the right of Negroes to attend the public schools; those
who proposed the bill did not deny that it would have such an
effect. Many of the congressmen who debated the civil rights bill
had helped frame the Fourteenth Amendment. A little indirect
light is reflected on the meaning of the Amendment itself in the
debate on this legislative proposal in that some congressmen opposed passage of the bill because they believed it did not grant the
Negro any rights he did not already possess under the Amendment.
The important aspect of the inquiry into the meaning of the
Fourteenth Amendment is that the evidence was inconclusive.
Presumably the Court could answer its own question in the affirmative or in the negative, depending upon its interpretation of the
weight of the evidence. The Court had to decide whether or not
an application of the Amendment could be adopted because it was
warranted by the apparent policy of the Amendment, although
such an application was not also affirmatively supported by the
legislative history showing 'that its framers and ratifiers so
intended.
It is a maxim in statutory construction that the legislative
intent must be followed. It is questionable whether the same principle should be applicable to the construction of a constitutional
provision; even so, courts need give little attention to debates in
the legislative halls when the evidence is inconclusive. Furthermore, debate on a constitutional amendment is of less materiality
than debate on an ordinary legislative bill because the amendment
must be ratified in the states before it becomes effective. Who can
say that the ratifiers had in mind the same meaning as the congressmen who proposed an amendment? In Maxwell v. Dow 3 the
Court said,
• . . the question whether the proposed amendment itself expresses the meaning which those who spoke in its
favor may have assumed that it did, is one to be determined
by the language actually therein used and not by the
speeches made regarding it. What individual senators or
representatives may have urged in debate . . . does not
furnish a firm ground for its proper construction.
In addition, ample precedent exists for construing constitu' 176 U. S. 581, 601-602 (1900).
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tional provisions in the light of present-day situations rather than
according to situations existent at the time the provision was
adopted. "A principle to be vital, must be capable of wider application than the mischief which gave it birth."'4 Ever since Mr.
Chief Justice Marshall spoke his much-quoted warning that "we
must never forget that is a constitution we are expounding,"., the
Court has often demonstrated its awareness of changing times.
In Home Building and Loan Association v. Blaisdell,6 Mr. Chief
Justice Hughes said,
If by the statement that what the Constitution meant
at the time of its adoption it means today, it is intended
to say that the great clauses of the Constitution must be
confined to the interpretation which the framers, with the
conditions and outlook of their time, would have placed
upon them, the statement carries its own refutation.
The Court has intimated that it is especially necessary for a
court to take cognizance of changing concepts of constitutional
provisions when basic rights are at issue. In Wolf v. Colorado,Mr. Justice Frankfurter said,
Basic rights do not become petrified as of any one
time, even though as a matter of human experience, some
may not theoretically be called eternal verities. It is of
the very nature of a free society to advance in its standards of what is determined reasonable and right. Representing as it does a living principle, due process is not
confined within a permanent catalog of what may at a
given time be determined the limitation or the essential
of fundamental rights.
Thus, we have in the public-school segregation decision a
demonstration in statutory construction applied to a constitutional
amendment involving fundamental rights of our people. The Court
apparently took the view that the intention of the framers and
the ratifiers of the Fourteenth Amendment was immaterial, especially because it was not conclusively proved; but, regardless of
proof, because the Amendment must be interpreted today in the
light of today's conditions.
FEDERAL POWER OVER STATE'S RIGHTS

The Tenth Amendment to the Constitution reserves to the
states all powers not delegated to the federal government. That
public education is not a delegated power has been so well accepted
that documentation should be needless. In 1899 it was claimed
that the public-school system was unconstitutional under the Four4

Weems v. United States, 217 U. S. 349, 373 (1910).
McCulloch v. Maryland, 4 Wheat. 316, 407 (1819).
'290 U. S. 398, 442-43 (1934).
338 U. S. 25, 26 (1949).
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teenth Amendment; however, Mr. Justice Harland made the following statement in Cumming v. County Board of Education,8
The education of the peor1 ' in schools maintained by
state taxation is a matter belonging to the respective
states, and any interference on the part of federal authority with the management of such schools cannot be justified except in the case of a clear and unmistakable disregard of rights secured by the supreme law of the land.
(Italics supplied)
Thirty-eight years later, a more categorical statement was
made by Mr. Chief Justice Taft speaking for the Court in Gong
Lum v. Rice,9 "The right and power of the state to regulate the
method of providing for the education of its youth at public expense is clear." Since then, however, the Court has established
new precedent for vindicating rights secured by the Fourteenth
Amendment in public-school situations, even before the turning
point in segregation cases at the graduate-school level. In West
Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette,10 the statement
was made that
the very purpose of a bill of rights was to withdraw certain subjects from the vicissitudes of political controversy, to place them beyond the reach of majorities and
officials and to establish them as legal principles to be applied by the courts.
If the Tenth Amendment were to be interpreted as leaving
each state entirely free to choose the type of school system it desires,
no federal court could substitute its judgment for the choice made
by a state. Howvever, though public education is a power reserved to
the states, the judicial power of the Court extends to matters
within the scope of the Fourteenth Amendment.
CONCURRENT JURISDICTION OF CONGRESS AND THE COURTS

The fact that an issue touches upon political matters does not
render the Court incompetent to decide questions of constitutional
rights. Judicial power has been said to be lacking in some cases
where the matter was purely political.'' These cases, of course,
differ from those which are primarily constitutional questions,
though they may have political undertones.
Review of the election returns and qualifications of the members of Congress is outside the jurisdiction of the courts because
it is a matter specifically delegated to the Congress itself, 12 and by
implication denied the judiciary. That the implementation of the
- 175 U. S. 528, 545 (1899).
'275 U. S. 78, 85 (1927).
"319 U. S. 624, 638, 639-40 (1943).
The Protector, 12 Wall. 700 (1872).
"U. S. Const. Art. I, sec. 5.
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Fourteenth Amendment does not fall into the same category is
evidenced by many cases preceding the current segregation decision. They are too numerous to cite. Nevertheless, the possibility
was suggested that implementation of the Fourteenth Amendment
is a political issue delegated by the Constitution to Congress in
Section 5 of the Amendment.
Many of us forget that the Amendment contains more than
the statement of basic rights which is in Section 1. Section 5 reads,
"The Congress shall have power to enforce, by appropriate legislation, the provisions of this article." The question then was
whether congressional action was prerequisite to application of the
Amendment to segregated schools or whether the Court could make
the application in the absence of congressional action.
If the right of Negroes to attend the public schools with white
children was clearly within the meaning of the Amendment, the
judicial power to so declare was acknowledged; but, those who
opposed this interpretation of the Amendment argued that Congress had exclusive jurisdiction to extend the federal control into
"undefined areas on the periphery of equal protection." The Court
-any court-has no power to legislate, particularly beyond the
limits of the Constitution. So, the scope of judicial power depended in part on the meaning to be given the Amendment itself.
Congress has acted to prohibit certain types of segregation
and thus has exercised its authority under Section 5 of the Amendment. It has the power to do likewise with regard to the public
schools if it chooses, the Tenth Amendment notwithstanding.
The attorney general for the State of Kansas urged the Court
to assume the same attitude toward the schools as it had with regard to the commerce clause of the Constitution. Section 8 of
Article I enumerates the powers of Congress. Subsection 3 empowers Congress "to regulate Commerce with foreign nations, and
among the several states, and with the Indian Tribes." In Cooley
13
v. Board of Wardens of Philadelphia,
the Court pointed out in
1851 that the grant of a power to Congress cannot be divorced from
the subject matter of the grant; and in holding that the states had
the right t6 legislate with regard to pilots the Court said that its
decision
. * . does not extend to the question what other subjects, under the commercial power, are within the exclusive control of Congress, or may be regulated by the
states in the absence of all congressional legislation; nor
[does the opinion refer] to the general question, how far
any regulation of a subject by Congress, may be deemed
to operate as an exclusion of all legislation by the states
upon the same subject.
In the absence of federal action (by Congress) the states may
enact laws regulating interstate commerce as to matters of local.
"112 How. 299, 320 (1851).
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concern. This principle has developed under the commerce clause;
it does not necessarily thereby apply to other subjects, as indicated in the Cooley case. The Court refused to make a similar application to the public schools.
Because of the inclusion of Section 5, which empowers Congress
to implement the rights guaranteed by Section 1, there is no reason
why judicial power should be denied in an area within which Congress has not acted. Concurrent power exists. The Court has construed the Amendment many times in circumstances on which Congress had not legislated. 14 These many decisions, including the
recent graduate-school segregation cases, would have to be overruled if that theory were not to prevail.
Individuals injured by violation of the Fourteenth Amendment have never been denied access to the courts merely because
Congress has not acted to provide general remedial legislation. 15
When Congress exercises its power to enforce the Amendment,
"the majestic generalities of the Fourteenth Amendment are thus
reduced to a concurrent statutory command.'- 6 So weighty are
the precedents that to hold today that Congress has exclusive jurisdiction would be a complete reversal of scores of decisions and
would nullify the effectiveness of our Bill of Rights.
EQUITY POWER OF THE COURT

The Court has jurisdiction in equity as well as in law. The
Court has the power to use its discretion in shaping equitable decrees and in controlling their execution so as to protect public
interest. 7 By act of Congress, the Court has power to enter "such
appropriate judgment, decree or order or require such further proceedings to be had as may be just under the circumstances."",
When a legal right has been violated and will continue to be violated, the individual is entitled to relief which will be effective to
redress the wrong. However, the Court must take into account
not only the rights of the parties but the public interest as well.
A court of equity is not restricted to particular forms of relief. It has full power to direct whatever remedy it considers will
14Even

in this particular subject matter:

Sweatt v. Paintbr, 399 U. S. 629

(1950); McLaurin v. Oklahoma State Regents, 339 U. S. 637 (1950); Sipuel v.
Board of Regents, 332 U. S. 631 (1947); Missouri ex rel. Gaines v. Canada, 305
U. S. 337 (1938). In other fields: Smith v. Allwright, 321 U. S. 649 (1944),
with respect to voting; Henderson v. United States, 339 U. S. 815 (1950), with
respect to travel; Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U. S. 1 (1948), with respect to land
ownership; District of Columbia v. John R. Thompson Co., 346 U. S. 100 (1953),
with respect to restaurants; Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen v. Howard, 343
U. S. 768 (1952), with respect to employment; Avery v. Georgia, 345 U. S. 559
(1953), with respect to jury service.
"Virginia v. Rives,. 100 U. S. 313 (1880). But see Ex parte Virginia, 100
U. S. 339 (1880), never followed in subsequent cases, of which there have been
many, including those cited supra note 14.
16Fay v. New York, 332 U. S. 261, 282-83 (1947).
"1Securities and Exchange Commission v. U. S. Realty and Improvement

Co., 310 U. S. 434 (1940); U. S. v. Morgan, 307 U. S. 183 (1939); Virginia Ry.
Co. v. System Federation No. 40, 300 U. S. 515 (1937).
"28 U. S. C. 2106.
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best serve the ends of justice in the particular circumstances.
Therefore, conventional remedies are often adapted to meet the
needs of unusual situations. In connection with the citation of
instances where decrees have been adjusted to meet particular circumstances, the Court's opinion in Addison v. Holly Hill Fruit
Products 19 included the following colorful statement,
The creative analogies of the law were drawn upon
by which great equity changes, exercising imaginative
resourcefulness, have always escaped the imprisonment
of reason and fairness within mechanical concepts of the
common law.
In granting relief to civil cases against a practice or conditions found to be unlawful, courts have frequently suspended the operation of their decrees on grounds of inconvenience to the public or undue hardship to the wrongdoer and
have allowed sufficient time for removing the illegality.2 0 The
Court on May 17 followed these precedents. It declared the principle of law but postponed direction of the remedy to allow the
parties concerned and other collaterally interested to study and
plan procedures to correct the unlawful practices and conditions.
The postponement of the decrees was not only within the judicial
power but was in the interest of the public.
On December 6 the Court will hear proposals of the several
states with regard to their plans for eliminating the unconstitutional segregation of races in the public schools. The interval
between pronouncement of illegality and the final disposition of
the issues by the Court raises many other questions of constitutional law and judicial practice.
INTERIM UNCERTAINTIES

Questions that lawyers, educators, and laymen are asking
during these months between May 17 and the issuance of the final
decrees pertain to the breadth of the decision. Does the decision
apply only to the individuals who instituted the five cases included
in the opinions of May 17? How does the pronouncement of unconstitutionality affect similar practices in other jurisdictions?
Have provisions in state constitutions and state laws permittng or
requiring segregated schools been ipso facto nullified? Should
states that have practiced segregation but that were not parties
in the five cases participated in the hearings scheduled for December 6? If they do, does their participation alter their status
after the final decrees are entered?
Briefs Amicus Curiae
When the Court asked the parties in the segregation cases to
return months later to discuss plans for implementing the de19322 U. S. 607, 620-22 (1944).

" United States v. American Tobacco Co., 221 U. S. 106 (1911); Georgia v.
Tennessee Copper Co., 206 U. S. 230 (1907); Northern Securities Co. v. U. S.,
193 U. S. 197, 360 (1904).

410
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cision of May 17, it also invited other states with segregated
schools though they were not parties to these cases. Of the 17
states primarily concerned with the decision, directly or indirectly,
some have accepted and some have declined to participate in the
December hearings. Those which have declined are convinced that
to accept would make them subject to the instructions ensuing
thereafter from the Court. Those which have accepted the opportunity to place before the Court the problems they will face in
complying with the principle of integrated schools have accepted
for one or both of two reasons: They wish to abide by the law as
interpreted by the Court on May 17 or they have been assured that
to participate in the hearings does not make them subject to the
Court since they were not parties to the original suits.
Since learned counsel in the several states have taken opposite
views on the effect of filing a brief or appearing for oral argument
when not a party to the suit, it is in order to examine into the
facts and the motives that may be behind each point of view.
Participation in a case by one not a party is permissible with the
consent of the court and the parties to the action. Such participation at the invitation of a court sets the stage even more precisely
than when the participation is at the request of a nonlitigant.
These participants are invited to give information to the Court,
information which will assist the Court in making its decision.
The participation is as a friend of the court.
Briefs amicus curiae are quite common. The only unusual
feature in this instance is that the Court extended the invitation;
whereas, ordinarily the friend of the court takes the initiative.
The legal effect is the same. Unlimited experience has proved that
the decision in a case in which friends of the court have filed briefs
or assisted in oral argument has not subjected them to the jurisdiction of the court. Therefore, it appears that the expressed fear
of making themselves subject to subsequent instructions by the
Court hides deeper fear of showing the Court plans for circumventing the decision.
Those who have agreed to participate in the December hearings have indicated their willingness to abide by the decision even
though they are not parties to these cases. They are interested in
laying before the C6urt their problems in attempting to desegregate the schools so that the Court's final disposition of the current
cases will take into consideration all the problems, which admittedly differ in different jurisdictions. There is also the thought
that proposals for putting the decision into effect may be approved
by the Court so as to avoid future litigation.
Those who have refused to participate in the December hearings, on the other hand, have indicated their intention to continue
segregated schools if a way can be found to do so. They cannot
present to the Court an informative brief showing problems and
plans in an unbiased way. They have declared that they will not
take any steps toward the desegregation of their schools unless
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and until forced to do so by an order directed specifically to litigants within their own jurisdiction.
It seems that no question could be seriously considered as to
the effect of filing a brief as a friend of court in typical cases.
Therefore, those who have expressed the fear that doing so in this
instance would subject them to instructions from the Court are
using this threat to avoid placing their plans before the Court,
expecting thereby to develop some scheme that will at least delay
desegregation, that will necessitate future litigation, in the hope
that the Court may eventually circumscribe the flat pronouncement
of May 17.
As a matter of fact, all states which have practiced segregation in the public schools will be bound indirectly by the decree
regardless of whether they have individually been parties to the
five current cases or participants in the December hearings as
friends of the Court. The applicability of the decrees will be less
direct but probably just as influential ultimately in the states that
boycott the hearings as in those participating.
Class Suits
In each of the five cases decided on May 17, the individuals
instituting the suits pleaded for relief for themselves and for all
other similarly situated. They were class suits. Therefore, the
decrees will be applied not only to the children whose names appear
in the pleadings in these particular cases but to all children attending the public schools in these jurisdictions. Since the constitutional provisions and state laws declared to be unconstitutional
have statewide application in most instances, the decrees may be
said to be applicable to all children within those states.
The attorney general for the State of South Carolina claims
that because county boards of education in his state have considerable autonomy in school management, the case that originated
in South Carolina is a local issue affecting Clarendon County only,
not affecting the other counties of the state. The error in this
theory seems obvious since segregation in Clarendon County and
in all counties in South Carolina has been based upon a provision
in the state constitution that has statewide applicability.
Of more importance is the contention that the decision does not
apply in states that were not parties to the five cases. Technically
that may be true. However, it could be argued that "all others similarly situated" could refer to all Negro children barred from admission to schools attended by white children, no matter where
located. It depends upon how far one can expand the class. Regardless of this point, however, if states not involved directly in
these five cases continue to maintain separate schools, suits will be
brought in each of them and the Court would probably deny certiorari on the ground that the issue had been decided on May 17,
1954. Such was the result in several cases pending before the

DICTA

November, 1954

Court on the date it decided these particular cases. 2 1 Probably
some states may await this inevitable result, while others will accept the general principle laid down in the five cases and consider
that it is applicable to the similar situations in their states.
Effect of a Declaration of Unconstitutionality
It has been said that the constitutional provisions and state
laws providing for segregated schools remain on the books of the
various states and are the law until eliminated by state action; that
the declaration by the Court that such provisions violate the Federal Constitution has no immediate effect, especially until the decrees are ordered after the December hearings. What about the
general principle that a provision declared to be unconstitutional
is as if never enacted?
Most of the states, including those that have announced their
intention to abide by the Court's decision without resistance, have
stated that their provisions for segregated schools remain operative until they can be eliminated by state action. Such action, they
say, takes time even when the state officials are willing to proceed.
Had any state initiated the process of repealing a state constitutional provision on the day after the Court announced its ruling,
it could have concluded the process in a matter of months-possibly
in time to remove the provision before the opening of the school
years 1954-55. The possible rapidity of action to amend a state
constitutional provision has been demonstrated in at least one state
which has held a special session of the legislature since the Court's
decision, adopted a proposal to repeal the constitutional provision
providing for a public-school system, and made arrangements for
the proposal to be considered by the voters at a special election.
Equal speed could have been demonstrated to eliminate the unconstitutional provisions for segregation, had any state so desired.
Also, the administrative problems inherent in changing from a
segregated to an integrated school system are said to require time
-yet a number of schools and some entire school systems have
been changed over at least in part at the opening of the fall term
in September 1954, just four months or less from the day the decision was announced.
Noteworthy is the fact that many states that have taken no
action to delete legal provisions for segregated schools have taken
administrative action looking toward integrated schools. These
1 State of Florida ex rel. Hawkins v. Board of Control, 347 U. S. 971; Tureaud v. Board of Supervisors of Louisiana State University and Agricultural
and Mechanical College, 347 U. S. 971; Wichita Falls Junior College District v.
Battle, 204 F. (2d) 632 (C. A. 5th, 1953), cert. den. 347 U. S. 974. Applying the
decision in nonschool areas: Municipally owned amphitheater-Muir v. Louisville Park Theatrical Assn., 347 U. S. 971; Golf courses-Holcombe v. Beal, 193
F. (2d) 384 (C. A. 5th, 1951), cert. den. 347 U. S. 974; Public housing-Housing
Authority of San Francisco v. Banks, 120 Cal. App. (2d) 1, 260 P. (2d) 668
(1953), cert. den. 347 U. S. 974; In the Hawkins, Tureaud and Muir cases petitions for certiorari granted judgments vacated, cases remanded "for consideration in the light of the segregation cases."
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school officers, apparently, do not believe that they are acting
illegally in ordering or encouraging steps in the integration process in violation of their own state provisions requiring segregated
schools. The fact of the matter is that school officers who are disregarding the state provisions for separate schools cannot be penalized for violation of their state provisions, since they are following the supreme law of the land. Article VI of the Federal Constitution reads,
This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States
which shall be made in Pursuance thereof ... shall be the
supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges of every State
shall be bound thereby, any thing in the Constitution or
Laws of any State to the contrary notwithstanding.
Actually, in the states where the decision has been most bitterly opposed officially, there exists an occasional oasis where the
children of both races have been or are now attending the same
schools. The decision of May 17 makes this procedure legal despite state provisions to the contrary.
Before the Court decided to postpone the decrees and in so
doing postponed the final decision until the October 1954 term, it
had considered whether or not to order desegregation immediately
and to require admission of Negro children "forthwith" to schools
previously attended by white children only. Counsel urged the
Court, that if it so decided, to interpret "forthwith" as meaning
no sooner than the school year 1955-56. Gradual adjustment was
hoped for. The Court recognized the necessity of time for planning, but no one knows how much time the states will be given
after the Court considers the evidence in the December hearings
and learns how much has been accomplished already, how real is
the resistance in some jurisdictions, and how sincere is the attempt
to achieve constitutionality in other jurisdictions.
In the meantime, the states are considering their problems
and making their plans. 2 2 Committees and commissions have been
appointed in almost every one of the Southern states; in some instances with a view toward continuing segregated schools if possible by lawful means, in other instances to recommend methods
for integrating the races. Not all these committees and commissions have issued public reports of their recommendations. 2 3 Yet
it is well known that several states are developing techniques in
preparation for a "last ditch" fight.
CONSTITUTIONALITY OF CIRCUMVENTING TECHNIQUES
Although the suggestions may never materialize, a number
"See Soiuthern School News, a factual and objective summary of how the
states are reacting to the segregation decision. Free, sponsored by Ford Foundation. Nashville, Tenn. First issue September 3; second issue, October 1.
Outstanding is the report to the Governor of North Carolina prepared by
the Institute of Government, University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill, 206
pp. August 1954.
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of variations of the "private-school" plan have received considerable publicity and have progressed officially further than any of
the other suggested circumventing techniques. Constitutional
amendments have been proposed and already adopted in South
Carolina making it possible to abolish the public-school system and
permit the education of all children of school age by private-school
facilities.
In the Civil Rights Cases of 1883, the Court held that individual action was beyond the restrictions of the Fourteenth Amendment, that the Amendment applied only to official acts of the state
through one of its official agencies. 24 Today, this distinction no
longer exists. By analogy with nonschool decisions 25 it would appear that the private-school plans would lay the state open to
challenge with less than a 50-50 chance of winning. The private
schools are almost certain to be considered state instrumentalities,
though ostensibly under private control. 26 Also, since public education has been held to be a governmental function in many types of
cases over the years, any institution that performs this function
for the state may be said to be performing a governmental function and hence subject to the same restrictions as would obtain if
the function were performed directly by the government or one
of its official agencies.2 7 State action has been found in so many
controversies over activities conducted by private agencies that
any attempt to maintain a private-school system as a substitute
for the public-schools in order to perpetuate segregation of the
races should be approached with the awareness that such a plan
is likely to do no more than to postpone the "evil" day.
One state suggested, instead of a private-school plan, that
teachers' contracts be executed in such a way that each teacher is
obligated to teach only the children of his own race. Since the
school officers executing these contracts are agents of the state,
their action would obviously be state action, subject to challenge
as an attempt to do indirectly what the state cannot lawfully do
directly. 28 The illegality of this plan appears even more certain
than that of the private-school scheme.
Another state has proposed to give local school authorities ex-2109 U. S. 3 (1883).
Especially important are the following cases:
Muir v. Louisville Park
Theatrical Assn. 347 U. S. 971 (1954) vacating judgment of Court of Appeals
of Sixth Circuit, ibid. 202 F. (2d) 275 (C. A. 6th, 1953); Terry v. Adams, 345
U. S. 461 (1953); Smith v. Allwright, 321 U. S. 649 (1944); Baskin v. Brown,
-

174 F. (2d) 391 (C. A. 4th, 1949); Rice v. Elmore, 165 F. (2d) 387 (C. A. 4th,
1947); Kerr v. Enoch Pratt Free Library of Baltimore City, 149 F. (2d) 212
(C. A. 4th, 1945) ; Nash v. Air Terminal Services, 85 F. Supp. 545, 549 (D. Va.,
1949); Lawrence v. Hancock, 76 F. Supp. 1004 (D. W. Va., 1948); Culver v.
City of Warren, 84 Ohio App. 373, 83 N. E. (2d) 82 (1948) ; City Commissioners
of City of Newton, 151 Kans. 565, 100 P. (2d) 709 (1940).
:' Action of private organizations has been considered state action, making
the private organizations instrumentalities of the state. The cases, cited supra
note 25, show the extent to which "state action" has been held to exist.
-TMarsh v. Alabama, 326 U. S. 501 (1945).
"IYick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U. S. 356 (1886).
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clusive power of assignment of pupils. If Negro students are initially enrolled in a school with white children, they could be transferred under the power of assignment. Again, illegality is thinly
veiled.
Other suggestions have been made, but in any of the techniques planned to circumvent the effect of the decision there is
ample cause for complaint on the part of those denied their constitutional right. Any of these plans, if they accomplish their objective, would continue a situation that the Court has declared
unconstitutional. Although there is no precedent exactly in point,
states that throw up roadblocks are certain to be called to account.
On the other hand, states that proceed affirmatively toward an
integrated program of public education may avoid reprimand by
the Court if their intentions are sincere and their gradulism is due
to administrative problems or fiscal difficulties.
JUDICIAL SUPERVISION OVER ENFORCEMENT

The Court has not decided how it will enforce its decrees.
Possibly it will exert no supervision; it did not do so in connection
with the graduate-school segregation cases. The Court, on the
other hand, may appoint special masters to formulate detailed
standards. Equally possible would be the time-honored custom of
remanding the five cases to the lower courts in which they originated, instructing these courts to work out detailed arrangements
with the states.
Discussion of these possibilities in advance of the decrees of
the Court is premature. Suffice it to say that none of the suggestions would establish new precedents in equity remedies.
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION

An attempt has been made in this paper to restrict the discussion to the legal points of constitutional law and judicial procedure of greatest interest to the legal profession, apart from the
subject matter of segregation in the public schools, interest in
social and educational repercussions of the May 17 decision in the
public-school segregation cases having overshadowed those legal
principles.
It was shown that the intent of framers and ratifiers of a constitutional amendment is not controlling, especially when that intent cannot be conclusively proved; that, though proof were conclusive, the Constitution is to be interpreted in the light of current
situations rather than by the meaning its framers and ratifiers
might have intended.
The rights guaranteed in the Fourteenth Amendment will be
enforced by judicial process regardless of the fact that one section of that Amendment grants concurrent power of enforcement
to the Congress, or the fact that the Tenth Amendment reserves to
the states some particular power. In other words, fundamental
rights cannot be invaded under the theory of states' rights; nor
need they await the legislative action of Congress.
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The Court in its plenary power to act in equity may frame its
decree in any way that its judgment dictates is for the best interest of the public and may postpone a decree to allow wrongdoers
time to plan procedures to correct their unlawful practices.
A situation declared to be unconstitutional is unconstitutional
for all who have created the situation. Even though a decree should
apply only to the parties of a suit or to all those similarly situated
in the same jurisdiction, the matter will be res adjudicatafor those
not parties to the suit. And this result will obtain whether or not
the nonlitigants participate in hearings called for the purpose of
planning practical application of the principle already announced.
Even though the unconstitutional provisions remain on the
books, they can no longer be enforced and those who follow the
supreme law of the land cannot be penalized for failure to abide
by a contrary state provision. Those who encourage the modification of a practice to coincide with the pronouncement of the Court
are acting in accordance with the law, regardless of contrary provisions of state or local jurisdictions.
The public-school segregation cases illustrate these principles
of constitutional law and judicial procedure. Perhaps "nothing
new has been added" in these respects, but the subject matter
makes the decision of May 17 a bench mark in the evolution of our
Country.
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THE ROLE OF THE TRIAL ATTORNEY*
KENNETH M. WORMWOOD of the Denver Bar

Preparation for a trial is certainly different these days than
it was in the days when I started in the practice of the law. In
those days we had the Code of Civil Procedure and our professors
would tell us all about code pleading and everything that we should
set up in our complaints. We were scared to death that if we didn't
say the right thing we would be out of court before we ever got
to the jury; quite often we were.
Now we have the Rules of Civil Procedure, which are streamlined and are certainly very different from the old code pleading
rules. I am a great advocate of the new rules, although I will have
to admit that there are some situations in which the new rules are
a little too simple. Practically all that must be done in this day
and age is for the plaintiff to draw up a complaint, "John Jones vs.
Jim Smith-comes now the plaintiff who says the defendant dfd
it." Whereupon some defense attorney files an answer and says
in reply to the plaintiff, "The defendant says he didn't do it." And
you're at issue.
Preparation for trial is a complex matter. Difficulties start
long before you walk into the courtroom to select a jury. Preparation is essential. One must know what his case is about, and certainly should know what his opponent's case is about, before getting into the courtroom. Our new Rules of Procedure are very
helpful in this matter and in many ways in preparing a case for
trial. Just as the football coach scouts the opposing team, so the
trial attorney will scout his opposition to find out just what kind
of play he is going to call at the time of the trial.
This article contains no trade secrets but does contain facts
that are already known, or should be known by trial lawyers.
I don't think you can over emphasize the importance of taking
full advantage of the discovery rules under our Rules of Civil
Procedure. Its one way to find out what the opposition knows or
what they are going to claim. Many illuminating things may be
discovered from the opposition through depositions. Our Supreme
Court has ruled that discovery depositions are luxuries, so one
can't charge them up as costs.
DEPOSITIONS

Depositions may be luxuries, but that's a luxury tax that a
client should be most happy to pay if he wants the case adequately
and properly tried. There are many attorneys--maybe I shouldn't
say "many," but there are some attorneys who think, "Well, let's
don't go to the expense of a deposition. Let's don't call in this plaintiff,"-or defendant, whichever side you are on-"to question him
on what he claims are the facts regarding this accident or the facts
* From a speech delivered at Colorado University Law Day, April 24, 1954.
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on whatever the controversy might be. Let's serve a bunch of
interrogatories." So they figure out maybe twenty-five, thirty,
forty or fifty interrogatories and serve these upon the opposing
attorney. I think that's a big mistake, because, when one does that,
here is what happens. The attorney says, "John, come on in, we've
got some questions here that we've got to answer." They sit down
and they really go over those questions-and they figure out just
what the answer should be. Now understand, they are honest about
it, but there is more than one way to answer a question and still be
honest. When those answers come back-it will be surprising
indeed if they are of any use to the attorney who served them.
An attorney for one of our public utility companies in Denver,
some time ago, had a practice of attaching to his answer one interrogatory to the plaintiff, in which he said, "Please state all of
the facts and circumstances surrounding the accident." The plaintiff's attorney invariably had a heyday with that kind of question
and in short, nothing of importance was learned. After doing that
for awhile he told me that he thought he had made a mistake and
had stopped the practice and was taking depositions.
Another valuable thing as to the deposition: it affords a chance
to see that witness, under oath, under cross-examination, as it
were, and to see how that witness acts. It gives one some idea how
that witness is going to act on the witness stand. I have found that
more than one case has been settled on the attorney's recommendation after the attorney has taken the plaintiff's deposition. I have
told a client, "That witness is going to crucify us when he (or she)
gets up before the jury. That witness is so convincing that the jury
is going to believe his (or her) story no matter what we say on our
side. We're stuck; we had better settle." That's just one of the
many considerations to keep in mind. Remember that under the
new rules people other than the parties may be questioned and that
discovery depositions are not limited to plaintiffs or defendants.
WITNESSES

If possible, when talking to witnesses, go over the evidence
with them. Don't put the witness on the stand without having
gone over their testimony with them. That may sound superficial,
but it is surprising how many attorneys do just that. They will
depend upon some junior in the office, who isn't trying the case,
to go out and round up the witnesses, and when put on the stand
witness and attorney confront each other for the first time. The
results are often disastrous.
Occasionally a witness wants to make a career of it. They love
to be on the stand. It presents a dangerous situation and an attorney must sometimes decide to exclude such a witness entirely
rather than chance unfavorable testimony. Sometimes, it's better
to have some evidence left out entirely than have a witness crucify
the party which called him.
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Never try a damage case-an automobile collision case-without first visiting the scene of the accident with your client if it is
physically possible to do so. Much can be clarified by such a visit
which would otherwise be impossible to visualize. I had a case one
time where our client, in attempting to pass another car, collided
with a car coming from the other direction. I could figure no possible defense. Since the case occurred at night, we went out to
the scene of the accident and watched-and lo and behold, just a
half mile from the point of collision there was a dip in the roadnot much of a dip-but enough that the lights of cars coming from
the other direction disappeared for about two and a half to three
seconds. We sat there and timed it. I at least had something to
argue to the jury, because when my client pulled out, the other
car was in that dip. The jury didn't believe me, but it was a good
argument. It might have worked, and at least it gave the opposition some worry.
Photographs are very important in these matters. When the
jury can see something with their own eyes it helps tremendously.
That's part of demonstrative evidence and is of some importance.
MEDICAL TESTIMONY
Medical testimony is another subject to think about. Like attorneys, practically all doctors are honest and sincere in their
beliefs, but medical science isn't an exact science. Two doctors
may not agree. It's very important when preparing to examine,
either to put on the evidence or to cross-examine a medical witness,
that you know something about medicine. Take time to talk to
your own medical witness about the problem. If the other medical
witness can't be present for trial-if they are going to take his
deposition-it is well to spend a little money and have your doctor
there when his deposition is taken, so that he can advise you as to
questions to ask on cross-examination.
PRE-TRIAL CONFERENCE

There has been and still is considerable controversy between
the older practitioners and the younger ones on the value of pretrial conferences. In fact, our Supreme Court is pretty well divided
on the value of pre-trial conferences, as demonstrated by some of
the decisions that have been handed down. I, personally, am a great
believer in pre-trial conferences. Law isn't a game; we are involved
with human rights, and we are playing for keeps. We have a
client's interests to represent, and it isn't a question of, "Well, I
am going to catch this boy, and boy, am I going to surprise him."
It is a question of knowing what the facts are-knowing what your
case is-knowing what the opposition's case is and whether or not
one should settle or go to trial. Then on the basis of these facts
honestly advise your client. One cannot honestly advise a client
unless there has been adequate preparation before trial including
a pre-trial conference where these matters come into the open.
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When it is ascertained who the witnesses are on the other side, if
an attorney doesn't know by that time what they are going to
testify to, an opportunity in which he can find out will be afforded
to him between the pre-trial conference and the trial date.
THE TRIAL

Now, concerning the trial itself. There is no question that the
plaintiff has an advantage over the defendant if he will utilize it.
He has the opening on the voir dire examination. He has the opening statement. He has the opening so far as the evidence is concerned. He has the opening argument, and he has the closing argument. And there is the poor defendant all along trying to say, "I
didn't do it," as it were.
As stated, plaintiff has a big advantage if he will use it. He
has the opportunity on voir dire of getting across to the jury
exactly what the case is about, or what this plaintiff claims it is
about. These first impressions are important. Of course, defense
attorneys try to minimize that. When defense attorneys get up
they start telling the jury, "Remember, there are two sides to every
question, and brother, we've got a side here." Point this out to
them:
"Remember now, the plaintiff can call any witness.
He can subpoena all of our witnesses too, if he wants to,
and call them ahead of us. Doing that would make you
think that everybody is for the plaintiff. But remember,
ladies and gentlemen of the jury, just because the plaintiff calls a witness doesn't mean that witness is for the
plaintiff. That witness is here to tell the truth no matter
which side called him and I am sure that if they hadn't
called all these witnesses, we would have."
As a matter of fact it may often be advisable to subpoena
practically all of the plaintiff's witnesses. It certainly doesn't hurt.
One can then ask the witness, "Now, Mr. Smith, you received a
subpoena from the defendant to be here too, did you?" "Yes."
And then, when you are through with the evidence you can say to
the court, "Well, we don't care to hold this witness for our defense.
This has all been brought out here on cross-examination." That
sometimes helps.
Another problem is that we are too apt to lose sight of the fact
that jurors are not lawyers. Many times a juror who sits on a case
has never been in a courtroom before. When the attorney gets up
before those jurors and argues legal points in complex terms, the
jurors think that he doesn't know what he is talking about. Then
when said jurors go into the jury room and look at all those instructions they are sure he doesn't know what he is talking about.
The attorney must get down to the jurors level and try to "communicate" with them, in common sense words which they will
understand. If one is trying a case in a mining district, don't wear
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a tuxedo, wear a blue shirt. They will think you are one of them,
just trying to get the truth across to them.
Bear in mind another matter. Don't object too much because
juries don't like it. Juries get the idea that the attorney is trying
to hide something from them. Objecting gives the appearance that
the opposition has something here it doesn't want out. It seems
wiser not to object unless there are two things present: first, that
your objection is good; and second, that it's important to keep out
what the party is going to say. Follow those two rules on objections and you will avoid giving a bad impression to the jury.
Don't always "save an exception" when the court overrules
you. This is no longer necessary under the Rules since they are
automatically saved for you. Such a practice serves only to take
the attention of the jury away from the issues of the case.
Determine beforehand in what order you want the witnesses
to appear. In this respect I recommend that the attorney for the
plaintiff not call the defendant for cross-examination as the first
witness. My reasoning is this: the plaintiff has enjoyed the advantage on the voir dire and on the opening statement to the jury
in which he has presented his case in its most favorable light. And
then whom does his attorney call? He calls the defendant for
cross-examination and affords him the opportunity to get his theory
of the case to the jury before any witnesses have substantiated the
plaintiff's story! It is a very bad mistake, but attorneys still do
it time and again. Actually, when I go into court I just pray that
my opposition will call my client in this manner.
DEMONSTRATIVE EVIDENCE
In recent years there has been an increase in the use of demonstrative evidence. Plaintiff attorneys are using it more and
more, and defense attorneys some. There is no objection to demonstrative evidence but let's be fair about it! Let's say a person
has a simple fracture of the arm. The idea of having a plaster
case or plaster model of the bones of the arm made, having it
marked as an exhibit, and then having the doctor take his pencil
and make a mark where the break was-and then to hand this to
the jury and have the jury look at this skeleton, serves no purpose
toward promoting justice. Such a practice does nothing but inflame a jury so that the plaintiff can get the largest possible damages irrespective of how good a result the doctor got on that broken
arm! Now I'm speaking like a defense attorney.
Recently I had a case where the plaintiff suffered very serious
injuries of the type that Arthur Godfrey had in which a new socket
and ball are made to replace a joint which has been irreparably
broken. It developed that there hadn't been too many of that kind
of operation, so the doctor who performed it had colored moving
pictures taken of the operation to use at the University of Colorado School of Medicine. When the plaintiff's attorney found out
about it, he came into court with the colored movie film of this
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operation and wanted to show it to the jury. I objected and asked
that we have a private showing first to see what the film was going to show. We had a private showing'and I nearly fainted, seeing all that blood and mecurochrome and whatever else it was. I
know that the judge was just about ready to faint too. When we got
through he said, "It will serve no useful purpose to have the jury
see that." As a result it was kept out. That was an attempt to
carry demonstrative evidence too far. Let's be fair. Get your
photograph. Get your plats. They are the things the jury should
see. If necessary, try to get the court to let the jury go out to the
scene of the accident if that will help. That type of evidence is
excellent.
Another practice to discuss is the use of blackboards. That
practice can work to produce both justice and injustice. California is one of the states where the use of blackboards for
a graphic impression on juries was developed. In a recent California case it was held to be improper to use a blackboard prior to
the closing argument. The use of blackboards in an opening statement is tantamount to putting up a chart that is not yet in evidence, or of putting up a picture of the scene of the accident which
isn't in evidence. What one does is to put before the jury, visually,
evidence not yet properly introduced into evidence.'
One more point in connection with blackboard calculations: so
many defense attorneys and plaintiff attorneys too, forget that
there is a difference between "life expectancy"and "work-life expectancy." A man may have a life expectancy up to 90, but that
doesn't mean he can work up to 90. There are charts on that, put
out by the Society of Actuaries, that are very helpful when one
happens to be on the defense. Of course if one is on the plaintiff's
side you would never think of such a thing as a "work-life expectancy."
Trail work is a lot of fun and a lot of work. There are many
headaches involved, and much worry. One can get a lot of grey
hairs and have many sleepless nights. When an attorney is dealing with the court, he should remember that he is dealing not only
with the judge but the jury. Be honest, concise, clear, polite, and
to the point. If the court asks about a certain point of law, and
you know what it is, even if it's against you, tell it. Don't start
hemming and hawing. The court is smart enough to tell when you
are bluffing. If an attorney tells the truth, the court will have more
respect for that attorney next time when the law is for him. It's
not only one's duty to do that, but it will pay dividends in the
long run.
Again, I say that throughout the trial of a law suit your
demeanor is important, and honesty is imperative! Whether you
win or lose, when you leave a courtroom at night and go home, if
you have done your job in a manner befitting an officer of the court,
you can't help but have a feeling of satisfaction.
I Bates v. Newman, 264 P. 2d 197 (1953).
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THE ADMISSIBILITY OF HEARSAY IN
HEARINGS BEFORE WORKMEN'S
COMPENSATION COMMISSIONS
CLYDE J. COOPER, JR.*

The law pertaining to Workmen's Compensation Acts cannot be traced to the Code of Justinian nor did Lord Mansfield coin
a rule concerning any phase of it. As law it is a babe in the woods,
sired by social necessity and mothered by a desire to solve an age
old problem in a modern, rational manner.
This new body of law first began to grow approximately
forty-five years ago when the legislatures, responding to the call
for a new remedy to solve the ever increasing problem of industrial
accidents, began to draft and make into law the first Workmen's
Compensation Acts.
Although the basic objectives and theories underlying these
acts are relatively simple, the many problems encountered in their
administration are numerous. The courts, unwilling as they have
been to accept these acts in their original tenor and to interpret
them in the light of legislative intent, have not only hampered
somewhat their effective operation but have in some instances
completely derogated their original purpose. The majority of
courts often refused to give "full faith and credit" to the provisions of these acts, especially those which purport to free the
tribunal from the technical rules of evidence.
The scope of this article will be limited to one of these problems and its aspects-the admissibility of hearsay viewed in the
light of the underlying motives and economic considerations which
brought these acts into being.
The legislatures in passing these acts realized the "unadaptibility of a common law system of proof rooted in the history of
the jury, to the solution of this pressing social problem" 1 and all
but a few 2 put the enforcement of these acts in the hands of administrative tribunals which would not be bound by the technical
and complex procedures of the common law. "The legislatures
heeded the deep sense of injustice felt by workers that the burden
of proof rested always on them and that probative evidence was
often kept out because it was hearsay. ' 3 This feeling was ably
expressed by Justice Winslow in Borgnis v. Falk Company: "To
speak of the common law personal injury action as a remedy for
this problem is to jest
with serious subjects, to give a stone to one
'4
who asks for food."
* Student, University of Denver, College of Law.

Ross, The Applicability o1 Common Law Rules of Evidence in Proceedings
Before Workmen's Compensation Commission. 36 HARV. L. REV. 263 (1922-23).
2Alabama, Louisiana, New Hampshire, New Mexico, Rhode Island, Tennessee, and Wyoming.
Note 1 supra.
S147 Wis. 327, 348, (1911).
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THE PROBLEM IN GENERAL

Let us begin the discussion with this general premise; hearsay
is always admissible if no objection is made by the party adversely affected. This is well settled and in line with the principles
of the common law. The problem arises when such evidence comes
in over the objection of the one adversely affected or after being
admitted, it forms the sole basis for an award in favor of the
proponent of said evidence.
Why is hearsay so subject to objection? The following are
the major reasons advanced for its exclusion, contrasted with arguments urged for its general application. It is said that hearsay
is inadmissible because it is incompetent and inherently weak;
and also, that its probative value is so slight that it does not
justify the time spent in sifting it about in an attempt to find
whatever element of truth it might contain. On this point Chief
Justice Marshall had this to say:
Hearsay evidence is in its own nature inadmissible.
That this species of testimony supposes some better testimony which might be adduced in the particular case is
not the sole ground of its exclusion. Its inherent weakness, its incompetency to satisfy the mind of the existence of the fact, and the frauds which might be practiced under its cover, combine to support the rule that
hearsay evidence is totally inadmissible.5"
If we adopt this position then we must say that all hearsay
is unreliable and under no circumstances does its value justify its
admission. "It would be as reasonable to insist that generality and
certainty require all killings to be punished as murder or all promthat all
ises to be enforced as contracts as on this
'6 basis to require
hearsay be excluded as untrustworthy."
The very nature of workmen's compensation cases make them
difficult of proof, especially where there has been a death. The
usual case is that a workman has been injured on his job, struck
with a block of ice or had his nose pierced with a splinter, and
there are neither witnesses to the accident nor any official accident report. However, the worker may tell a fellow worker about
the accident or relate the incident to his wife upon returning home
that evening. Several days later he dies from a brain hemmorrhage, blood infection or even delerium tremens. What evidence of the cause of death do we have other than the hearsay
testimony of the fellow worker or the widow? What will be their
reaction when they are told that their testimony is "legally" incompetent or inherently weak? The obvious injustice of such a
ruling is clear. We can see that it would be far better to grant an
award based on this hearsay testimony than to force the family
5Mima

Queen and Child v. Hepburn, 11 U. S. 290, 295 (7 Cranch-1813).
6 The Role of Hearsay in a Rational Scheme of Evidence. 34 ILL. L. REv. 788.
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of the deceased to bear the loss because it cannot meet the standard
of proof. That the hearsay rule itself is too harsh is evidenced by
its many exceptions. The whole theory behind workmen compensation acts is "to impose liability without fault to be borne by the
industry rather than by the family of the deceased. It is unreasonable to suspect that a deceased before death, will make false statements so that relief may accrue to his family. If this type of
hearsay evidence is excluded, the legislative aims are to such an
extent defeated. Usually no one else can supply these essential
facts. Applying the tests of necessity, availability,
and reason' 7
ableness, such statements should be admitted.
It is further contended that hearsay confuses the issues and
is too difficult to evaluate. This argument has merit in so far as it
offers protection to a jury, which it is said, is not capable of evaluating evidence according to its relative probative value. A jury
is thus limited to basing its verdict on "legal evidence" only and is
prevented from giving a verdict based on opinion or conjecture.
But, it may be asked, are the personnel of a jury today so untrained
or ill equipped that they cannot tell what is likely to be true and
what is likely to be a falsehood? Far more decisions are rendered
in today's complex world without the use of the hearsay rule than
those reached by its application. Visualize for a moment the
directors of a large corporation trying to make a policy decision
based on employees' reports, or a housewife selecting a household
appliance, basing her decision on reports from her friends. Can
we say that in either case their decision is wrong because it is
based on hearsay? Wigmore takes this position: "It is tolerably
obvious to practitioners that the jury trial rules of evidence do
not have a necessary relation to correctness of verdicts as today
administered.""
Acknowledging then that the use of the hearsay rule has
some merit in jury trial cases because of the inexperience of the
jurors and the fact that they are dealing with numerous types of
cases, we have a different situation when the tribunal is composed
of experienced professional men who day after day inquire into
the same general set of facts. Such is the situation with regard
to industrial commissions. It is clear that these men have the
ability to analyze accurately the evidence submitted and should be
allowed to hear all the evidence, hearsay included, and then decide
its relative probative value.9 "Any attempt to apply jury trial
rules of evidence to an administrative tribunal acting without a jury
is an historical anomaly, pre-destined to probable futility and
failure." 0
Furthermore, if we require an administrative tribunal such
Fact Finding Boards and the Ritles of Evidence, 24 A.B.A.J. 630 (1938).

'WIGMORE ON EVIDENCE, VOL. I (3rd ed.) Sec. 4b.

'An Approach to Problevms of Evidence in the Administrative Process. 36

HARV. L. REV. 364 (1942).
" WIGMORE o- EVIDENCE,

VOL.

I, (2nd ed.), p. 27.
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as an industrial commission to adhere to the very technical hearsay
rule, we must necessarily require that all the administrators be
lawyers. If the legislatures had intended such a result, they would
have put the enforcement of Workmen's Compensation Acts in the
courts. It is clear that even today many lawyers do not fully understand the scope of the rule and its many confusing exceptions.
The compensation commissioner before whom the
testimony is taken is not required to be a lawyer and may
not be versed in the technical rules of evidence that may
be involved and applied in courts trying common law
cases. Testimony that is relevant, reasonable and persuasive and which induces belief may be the basis of the
findings of the commission and if -its action and decision
are free from fraud, unfairness or mis-conduct, and are
based upon substantial and satisfactory evidence they will
be upheld."
By far, the principal objections to the use of hearsay is the
fact that it is not subject to the test of cross-examination. This
objection is difficult to meet, but is it a sufficient objection to keep
out hearsay which may have probative value? Cross-examination
is essentially a tool of strictly adversary proceedings, and as such
is not necessarily applicable to industrial commission hearings.
The underlying theory of workmen's compensation is "not a dispute between one individual and another but rather a dispute between an employee and the consumers in general,"'1 2 the cost of
awards being considered as just another item of industrial overhead.
Furthermore, the test of cross-examination effects weight
Gnly and not relevancy. If the original declarant intends to fabricate a story, it is unlikely that an oath or the right of cross-examination is going to defeat this purpose. In addition, the circumstances surrounding the making of these statements, i.e. following
an injury, lend a certain guarantee of trustworthiness to them. Most
persons are concerned enough about their personal health that it
is not likely they would lie as to the source of their injury at the
risk of not receiving the proper treatment.
What has been discussed so far barely begins to touch the
many complex problems involved in the subject of hearsay, but
this brief introduction should give us sufficient awareness of the
problem to proceed with a discussion of the present state of the
law in regard to the use of hearsay evidence under the various
state workmen's compensation acts.
VARIOUS PROVISIONS CONTAINED IN WORKMEN'S
COMPENSATION ACTS

Although the same thread of simplicity and non-technicality
"Coe v. Koontz, 129 Kan. 581, 283 P. 487.
"Note 1 supra.
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runs through most of the compensation statutes, they are by no
means all alike. The majority of acts contain provisions relating
either to a simplified mode of procedure or to relief of the tribunal
from strict adherence to the common law rules of evidence. Other
acts either give the tribunal the power to make its own provisions
in regard to procedure and the use of evidence or are silent on the
subject altogether. Acts which have spoken can be divided into
four general groups:
(1) Where the acts provide that the tribunal shall "not
be bound by the common law or statutory rules of
evidence" and a provision is usually added that
"technical and formal rules of procedure shall not
apply."
(2) Where the acts provide that the tribunal shall not be
bound by the technical rules of evidence (procedure).
(3) Where the acts merely say that the process shall be
as simple and summary as possible.
(4) Where state statutes contain no provisions relating
to evidence. However, the commission is usually
given power to make its own rules.
As we shall soon see, the wording contained in the various
statutes is not indicative of the procedure to be followed under
them. The courts in the majority of cases still refuse to give "full
faith and credit" to the obvious intent of the legislature.
The following are some of the principal cases interpreting the
provisions contained in the different types of workmen's compensation acts.
I. Where the tribunal is not bound by the common
law or statutory rules of evidence-technical and formal
rules of procedure shall not apply.
The leading case on the interpretation of this type of statute
is Carrol v. Knickerbocker Ice Company decided in New York in
1916.13 It illustrates the typical situation found under these acts
and is therefore worthy of detailed discussion.
In this case, the driver of defendant's ice wagon was allegedly
injured when struck by a cake of ice while unloading the ice wagon.
Several days later he died of delirium tremens which it is alleged
was caused by the injury. The only evidence in support of this
contention was certain declarations made by the decedent to his
wife and to the doctor who first treated him. Refuting this allegation were several eye-witnesses who testified that they knew
nothing of the alleged accident. An award was granted by the
Workmen's Compensation Commission based on the declarations
of the deceased. This award was affirmed by the appellate division
with two justices dissenting. The New York Court of Appeals in
reversing the appellate division announced the rule that has been
" 218 N. Y. 435, 117 N.E. 507 (1916).
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followed by a majority of jurisdictions in the interpretation of this
type of provision:
The act may be taken to mean that while the commission's inquiry is not limited by the common law or
statutory rules of evidence or by technical or formal rules
of procedure, and it may, in its discretion, accept any
evidence that is offered, still in the end there must be a
residium of legal evidence to support the claim before an
award can be made.
There were two dissents to this holding. Judge Seabury felt
that if the hearsay was of sufficient probative value, it should be
allowed to support a claim and that the requirement of a residuum
of legal evidence is in direct conflict with the spirit of the act.
Judge Pound dissented on the ground that the hearsay rule is essentially for the protection of the jury and that its probative
value should be left to the discretion of the tribunal.
Thus, a court is called upon to interpret a statute which expressly frees from the common law rules of evidence and yet the
court holds that they are binding.
Wigmore contends that the rule for a "residuum of legal evidence" rests on the assumption that the legal evidence is always
credible and sufficient
while the illegal evidence is never credible
14
nor sufficient.
Regardless of the criticism of the rule announced in this case,
it is nevertheless followed in the majority of jurisdictions regardless of the type of statute. The advocates of the rule holding that
hearsay is not a technical rule of evidence say that "it is founded
upon the experience, common knowledge and conduct of mankind."15
In an Iowa case, the court said, "Of course, the provision in
the Compensation Act, abolishing the common law and statutory
rules of evidence, does not dispense with the necessity for legal
evidence in support of a claim." 16
The Colorado Statute is in17this group and is interpreted in
accord with the New York rule.
8
In the case of Olson-Hall v. Industrial Commission,1
the
claimant's husband was alleged to have been injured when he fell
from a ladder, and it was alleged that his death was a direct result
of the fall. The only evidence of the accident was certain reports
and alleged conversations between the deceased and his wife prior
to his death. In opposition to this allegation was the unanimous
testimony of certain doctors that decedent's death was a result of
an organic disorder. The Industrial Commission excluded the
hearsay evidence offered by the claimant and refused her claim.
1"Note

8 supra.

"1Swim v. Central Iowa Fuel Co., 204 Iowa 546, 215 N. W. 603 (1927).
' Renner v. Model Laundry, C. & D. Co., 191 Iowa 1288, 184 N. W. 611 (1921).
CoLO. STAT. ANN., C. 97, § 24.
"71 Colo. 228, 205 P. 527 (1922).
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The district court in affirming the decision of the commission
said:
It is true that workmen's compensation statutes of
most states provide that the industrial commission shall
reach their conclusions without regard to technical rules
of evidence. It is manifest, however, that the rule against
hearsay is not technical, but vitally substantial, and
may not properly be disregarded under such statutory
provisions without grave danger of collusion, imposition
and injustice. If a claimant be permitted to make out a
case upon the essential facts of accidental injury upon
hearsay alone there is no limit to the frauds and
wrongs that may be encouraged and made possible.
This view was seconded in Empire Zinc v. Industrial Commission of Colorado.19 In that case, an accident report plus the
conduct of the company in paying the funeral expenses of the
deceased and the fact that they did not deny liability within fifteen
days as required were held to be sufficient evidence to sustain an
award.
In Public Service Company of Colorado v. Industrial Commission,20 the court said:
The weight of the evidence is a matter exclusively
for the determination of the Industrial Commission. It
is only where there is no competent evidence to support
the finding of the industrial commission that the court
will interfere with its award.
As time has passed, the courts have apparently felt the rule
requiring a residuum of legal evidence was too harsh, for they have
gone to great extremes to find the all important residium. In two
cases, the court felt that an employer's admission in a report was
sufficient residuum added to hearsay to support an award. 21 In the
case of Attschuller v. Bressler 22 "facts and circumstances" constituted the necessary residium. The court in that case declared:
The court has never required that such residium
should independently of the hearsay establish the accident. The sufficiency of the residuum of legal evidence
cannot be measured by any mechanical formula. There
must be evidence setting forth facts of a probative character outside of hearsay statements to prove the award
and show it is just and fair.
In Minnesota, the legislature has put the residuum rule into
their law. Although the commission is not bound by the common
1994 Colo. 98, 28 P. 2d 337.

2089 Colo. 440, 3 P. 2d 799.
"Anthus v. Rail Joint Co., 185 N. Y. Supp. 314; Lindquest v. Holler, 164
N. Y. Supp. 705.
= 289 N. Y. 463, 46 N. E. 2d 886 (1943).
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law or statutory rules of evidence, the statute expressly requires
that "all23 findings of fact shall be based only upon competent evidence."
In a recent Utah case,2 4 the court, after praising the merits of
the residuum rule, stretched the doctrine of res gestae all out of
proportion to support a claim based on statements made by a deceased workman to a fellow employee and later to his wife. The
cause of the death was alleged to be a bump on the head received by
the decedent in the course of employment. There were no witnesses
to the accident, but a fellow worker testified that the decedent
shouted to him "to be careful because when he (deceased) got up
quickly he gave his head a dirty bump"; and later when the deceased was asked by his wife how he received the bump on his head,
he replied, "he had given his head a 'hell of a crack' at work."
These statements were held to be part of the res gastae and thus
competent evidence to support an award.
Colorado has likewise come through the backdoor of res gestae
in order to find the all important residium of "legal" evidence. In
the case of Fotis v. The Industrial Commission,25 the deceased
(Fotis) was alleged to have injured his hip "kicking a switch at
the mine." An infection developed and he died shortly thereafter.
The only evidence of the injury was "statements made by him
(Fotis) to other witnesses who made written reports based thereon, to the company's physician who made a report based upon
what Fotis told him and by Fotis to his wife on his return home."
This evidence was excluded by the industrial commission as hearsay and the claim was denied. This was reversed by the district
court which held that the evidence should be admitted. On review
this decision was upheld with the court finding that these statements were part of the res gestae. Said the court:
Res gestae, while often spoken of as an exception to
the hearsay rule is generally not such in fact. Ordinarily
it relates to statements which, because of their intimate
relation to facts become a part of those facts and are
therefore admitted as such . . . Suffice it to say that
cases could be found which would justify the admission
of this evidence under a liberal construction of the rule
of res gestae. We prefer, however, to base our decision
upon the broader and more certain ground of one of the
exceptions to the hearsay rule.
It is clear that this case goes farther than the Utah case in
an attempt to justify the award of a claim based solely on hearsay
evidence, without violating the chastity of the residuum rule. One
wonders if there is any limit to the statements which could be held
admissible under this "liberal construction of the rule of res
"Minn. Gen. St. See. 4313 (1923).
'4Ogden Iron Works v. Industrial Comm., 102 Utah 492, 132 P. 2d 376 (1942).
112 Colo. 423, 142 P. 2d 657 (1944).

November, 1954

DICTA

gestae". Thus we see the same courts which refuse to recognize
that a valid claim can be based solely on hearsay resorting to
"legal gymnastics" to achieve a just result.
In Maryland, which adheres to the residuum rule, the court has
taken a more modern, rational view and recognized that in certain
eases a relaxation of the rule is wise and just if cautiously done.
The court has said:
We conclude therefore, that the courts are required to adapt themselves somewhat to the increased
latitude allowed to the commission, and that this adaption must at the same time, and as far as it can consistently be done, avoid abandonment of cautions and safeguards which seem necessary, not only for constitutional
due process of law, but also for the
assurance of relia2
bility in the basis of adjudication.
The California Statute among all the stautes considered under
this section best expresses the mandate of the legislature and leaves
little room for judicial interpretation. The statute, in addition to
containing the provision freeing the commission from the common
law and statutory rules of evidence, contains this provision:
No informality in any proceeding or in the manner
of taking testimony shall invalidate any order, decision,
award, rule or regulation nor will such be invalidated
because of the admission into the record, and use as proof
of any fact in dispute, of any evidence not admissible
under the said common law or statutory rules of evidence
and procedure.
Under this statute, it has been held that hearsay alone will
support a claim. In the case of Sada v. Industrial Accident Commission,27 the court said:
Under the rule which obtains in proceedings before
the commission the fact that a finding is supported
solely by hearsay does not of itself invalidate the finding
or stamp the proof as too unsubstantial to be credited.
Inasmuch as hearsay is admissible, the weight to be given
such evidence is a question for determination by the
commission and if in its judgment the evidence carries
convincing force, it may be sufficient to sustain an award.
Under this holding, the weight to be given hearsay is left
solely in the discretion of the commission. The court will not reverse unless the hearsay used is incredible as a matter of law. 28
Thus we see the very strict interpretation given by the major"Standard Oil Co. of N. J. v. Mealey, 147 Md. 252, 127 Atl. 850 (1925).
"11 Cal. 2d 263, 78 P. 2d 1127 (1938).
Pacific Employers Ins. Co. v. Indus. Accident Comm., 47 Cal. App. 2d 494
118 P. 2d 334 (1941).
2
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ity of courts to the most liberal provision contained in any of the
compensation acts. It is safe to assume that in our discussion of
the remaining types this narrow interpretation will .in most cases
be observed.
II. Where the tribunal is not bound by the technical rules of
evidence (procedure).
In a recent Pennsylvania case, 29 we again see the typical situation. An employee had been struck in the shoulder by a swinging
timber. An infection developed and shortly thereafter he died.
There were no witnesses to the accident, the only evidence being
the statements of the deceased to a fellow worker and to his wife
The wife testified however, that when he had left home the day of
the accident there were no bruises on his body but when he returned home his shoulder was bruised and cut. The court held this
fact was sufficient competent evidence to corroborate the hearsay.
"Under this evidence we believe that it is reasonable to conclude
that there was a natural connection between his work and the accident and that the circumstances would appear to be such as to
satisfy 'reasonable and well-balanced minds' that an accident did
occur." The court then sets up this test to determine the probative
value of this evidence:
The fact-finding body has a right to use the conclusions and tests of everyday experience and draw the inferences which reasonable men would thus draw from
similar facts.
Thus, a court which follows the residuum rule finds that if the
circumstances are such as to satisfy the "fair and rational man,"
the rule requiring some "competent evidence" has been satisfied.
In another Pennsylvania case, Nesbit v. Vandervort and
Curry,30 the court held that "where the facts are sufficiently established by circumstantial evidence, hearsay testimony, not inconsistent therewith, if relevant and material to the fact in issue,
may be considered for the additional light if any, that it throws
on the matter." Here the Pennsylvania court officially recognizes
that hearsay does, in some cases, have definite probative value but
still requires a residuum of legal evidence, no matter how slight.
The remaining states which contain this type of provision
(Kansas, Missouri, and Montana) have likewise climbed on the
"residuum rule bandwagon" holding that hearsay is admissible in
the discretion of the tribunal3 1but that there must be some legal
evidence to sustain an award.
Lambing v. Consolidated Coal Co., 161 Pa. Super 346, 54 A. 2d 291 (1949).
" 128 Pa. Super 58, 193 A. 393 (1937).
"Kansas-Parker v. Farmers Union Mutual Ins. Co., 146 Kan. 832, 73
P. 2d 1032.
Missouri-Wills v. Berberick's Delivery Co., 339 Mo. 856, 98 S. W. 2d
596 (1936).
Montana-Ross v. Industrial Accident Board, 106 Mont. 486, 80 P. 2d
362 (1938).
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The Kansas court in Parkerv. Farmers Union Mutual Insurance Company 32 adequately summed up the position taken by this
group in regard to hearsay:
Its admissibility is to be governed not by the venerable rules of Starkie or Greenleaf or Underhill on Evidence but under the liberal rule of evidence applicable to
hearings before compensation commissions. Although
desirable to the efficient administration of the compensation act that the examiner should understand the law of
evidence, particularly the inefficiency of mere hearsay to
support a claim for an award, the statute itself contemplates that the rigid rules prescribed for the trial of actions at common law shall not apply to proceedings under
the compensation act.
Most of the courts which permit the admission of hearsay are
much more liberal when the hearsay consists of statements of a
deceased relating to the cause of his death. In this same case, the
Kansas court announces the rule to be followed in that jurisdiction:
Where a workman dies of his injuries, the statements
he made to third persons touching the accident which
caused his injuries may be received and accorded probative force if such statements are inherently reasonable
and not intentionally made for the purpose of being used
as evidence to base a claim for compensation, and where
the other evidence and attendant circumstances corroborate the statements so convincingly as to establish the fact
of the workman's accident and injury with moral certainty.
It appears that most courts feel that this class of hearsay is
more trustworthy than other types. A more practical justification
for taking a liberal view of this type of hearsay is that in most
cases where the worker has died of his injuries, his declarations
constitute the only evidence as to the cause of death; therefore,
the courts must be liberal in order to achieve a just result.
The New York statute now expressly provides that statements
of a deceased worker concerning his injury shall be received in
evidence and "shall if corroborated by circumstances or other evidence, be sufficient to establish the accident or injury." This provision expressly puts the legislative stamp of approval on the doctrine announced in Carrol v. Knickerbocker, supra.
III. Where the statute provides that the process shall be as simple
and summary as reasonably may be.
This provision being couched in the most general terminology
of all the statutory provisions has, likewise, been subject to the
widest diversity of interpretation.
SZ Ibid.
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The courts in Virginia have repeatedly interpreted this provision to mean that not only is hearsay admissible but that a claim
can be supported on hearsay alone.
In the leading case of American Furniture Company v.
Graves,3 3 a carpenter in the defendants plant struck his finger with
a hammer. Shortly thereafter, he died of a serious blood infection.
The only evidence that the injury had been caused by the blow on
the finger was statements by the deceased to third persons. However, a doctor testified that the infection could have resulted from
a ruptured boil. The Supreme Court of Appeals in affirming the
award of the Industrial Commission based on the deceased's statements, said:
It is admitted in the argument for the employer that
under the Virginia Statute, the commission is not to be
governed in the hearing by common law rules of evidence,
and that the hearsay statements aforesaid, were properly
admissible in evidence. But it is claimed that the commission, after hearing such evidence, should have given
it no probative weight or value whatever in reaching its
findings of fact, if the evidence, other than hearsay state-,
ments was not of itself sufficient to support the findings.
We cannot bring our minds to assent to the correctness
of such a position. To do so would be to hold that the
statute, in making the hearsay evidence admissible, did a
useless and senseless thing. On the contrary, we think that
it follows inevitably from the fact that the hearsay is made
admissible by the statute, that the commission is given the
discretion to give it some probative weight, and that it is
for the commission to determine, and not for the court
what probative value, if any, they should give to it in arriving at the findings of fact. Manifestly, the court could
not interfere with the exercise of such discretion without
usurping powers which are conferred by the statute on
the commission, since the commission is the sole tribunal
provided, as aforesaid, to ascertain the facts.
This position has consistently been upheld whenever the question has arisen. 34 Virginia is the only state which has expressly
overruled the doctrine requiring a residuum of legal evidence to
support a finding of fact. Whether this court would go so far as
to sustain an award based on "double hearsay" is uncertain, but it
is likely that such a position would be held to violate the due process requirement that a finding must be based on some substantial
evidence.
The Illinois Court has reached the exact opposite result in
interpreting the same statutory provision. This jurisdiction has
- 1 4 1 Va. 1, 126 S. E. 213 (1925).
"Humphrees v. Boxley Bros. Co., 146 Va. 91, 135 S. E. 890 (1926);
v. Swift & Co., 188 Va. 366, 49 S. E. 2d 417 (1948).

Derby
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repeatedly held that the rules of evidence in proceedings under the
Workmen's Compensation
Act are no less strict than those in ac35
tions at common law.
As an example the Illinois court said:
In proceedings under the Workmen's Compensation
Act the rules respecting the admission of evidence and
the burden of proof are the same as prevail in common
law actions for personal injury. The procedure only is
different. Before a claimant can recover compensation, he
must prove by a preponderance of competent evidence all
the facts necessary to justify an award. Liability under
said Act cannot rest upon imagination, speculation, or
conjecture, but must be based upon
facts established by
36
a preponderance of the evidence.
However, this same court has refused to 3 7reverse a finding
where hearsay was admitted without objection.
The remaining states which have been called upon to interpret
the meaning of this provision have generally fallen in line with the
majority and held that although
hearsay is admissible, it cannot
form the sole basis of an award.3 8
IV. Where the statute contains no provision regarding the subject.
In Wisconsin, where the commission is given the power "to
adopt its own rules of procedure," the court has held that an award
must be based on some
competent evidence and that hearsay is not
39
competent evidence.
The
same position is taken in Maine, 40 Oklahoma, 41 and Rhode
42
Island.
And so it goes right down the list of remaining states, the
courts generally holding, whether there is statutory authority or
11Brewerton Coal Co. v. I. C., 324 Ill. 89, 154 N. E. 412 (1927) ; Sidney Wanzer
& Sons, Inc. v. I. C., 380 Ill. 409, 44 N. E. 2d 40 (1942); Selz-Schwab and Co. v.
I. C., 326 Ill. 120, 156 N. E. 763 (1927).
Inland Rubber Co. v. I. C., 309 Ill. 43, 140 N. E. 26 (1923).
Kivish v. I. C., 312 Ill. 311, 143 N. E. 860 (1924).
Idaho-Pierstoriffv. Gray's Auto Shop, 58 Ida. 438, 74 P. 2d 171 (1937).
Kentucky-Broadway & F.A.R. Co. v. Matcalft, 230 Ky, 800, 20 S. W. 2d
988.
Mass.-Johnson's Case, 258 Mass. 489, 155 N. E. 460 (1927).
Mich.-Green v. Sears & Roebuck & Co., 280 Mich. 274 N. W. 331, 568
(1937).
N. C.-Maley v. Thomasville Furn. Co.,214 N. C. 589, 200 S. E. 438 (1939).
Georgia-Merrittv. Continental Casualty Ins. Co., 65 Ga. App. 826, 16 S. E.
2d 612 (1941).
Indiana-White Swan Laundry v. Nuezolf, 111 Ind. App. 692, 42 N. E.
2d 391 (1942).
.S. Carolina-Spearmanv. Fs. Royster Guano Co., 188 S. C. 393, 119 S. E.
530 (1938).
' Milwaukee El. R. & L. Co. v. Glardiana, 222 Wis. 111, 267 N. W. 62 (1937).
Crowley's Case, 130 Me. 1, 153 Atl. 184 (1931).
4 Santa Fe Transp. Co. v. Vaughan, 146 P. 2d 827, 194 Okla. 16 (1944).
41 Reymold v. Freemason's Hall Co., 198 Atl. 553
(1938).
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not, that hearsay is admissible in the discretion of the commission
but that an award will not be upheld if based solely on hearsay that
has not been corroborated by other evidence which would indicate
the trustworthiness of the hearsay.
SOME MODERN VIEWS ON THE SUBJECT

The Federal Administrative Procedure Act, Section 7 (c)
provides:
Any oral or documentary evidence may be received,
but every agency shall as a matter of policy provide for
the exclusion of irrelevant, immaterial, or unduly repetitious evidence and no sanction shall be imposed or rule
or order be issued except upon consideration of the whole
record or such portions thereof as may be cited by any
party and as supported by and in accordance with the
reliable, probative, and substantial evidence.
Clearly, under this provision the strict common law rule excluding hearsay as incompetent has been abrogated. The provision permits the introduction of any evidence which is relevant
to the issues. Thus hearsay would clearly be admissible if found to
be relevant. Furthermore, hearsay could be the sole basis for a
finding if it were found to be "reliable, probative, and substantial ;"
that is, if the hearsay were "the kind of evidence on which reasonable persons are accustomed to rely in serious affairs, ''4 3 an award
based thereon would be upheld.
The Model State Administrative Procedure Act contains this
provision in Section 9 (1) :
Agencies may admit and give probative effect to
evidence which possesses probative value commonly accepted by reasonably prudent men in the conduct of their
affairs. They shall give effect to the rule of privilege
recognized by law. They may exclude incompetent, irrelevant, immaterial, and unduly repetitious evidence.
The effect of this provision clearly would permit the admission
of hearsay which had probative value and would seem to permit
a finding to be based on hearsay if of the type that reasonably prudent men rely on. But such is not the case. In Section 12 (7) (e),
the act provides that a reviewing court may reverse if the decision
is "unsupported by 'competent, material, and substantial evidence
in view of the entire record as submitted." Thus the requirement
of a residuum of legal evidence has been incorporated into the
model code.
Dissatisfaction with the present law relating to hearsay is
illustrated in the American Law Institute's Model Code of Evidence. Rule 503 states: "Evidence of a hearsay declaration is admissible if the judge finds the declarant (a) is unavailable as a
witness (b) is present and subject to cross-examination."
41N.L.R.B.

v. Rernmington Rand Inc., 94 F. 2d 862 (1938).
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This rule if adopted would abolish the common law rule altogether. It is clearly indicative of the present trend not only in
the field of administrative law but in all fields of law generally.
Morgan and Maguire have formulated what they consider
should be the hearsay rule.
Every statement having appreciable probative value
upon any issue shall be admissible, not withstanding any
rule of evidence to the contrary, if the trial judge shall
find that it was made in good faith as of the personal
knowledge of the declarant and that the declarant is unavailable for any reason other than the procurement of
the proponent. This rule shall apply in4 4 all judicial or
quasi-judicial proceedings of every kind.
Many years ago, Thayer summed up this feeling in what he
called the main
rule of evidence-"That whatsoever is relevant is
45
admissible."
At the Cincinnati Conference of Functions and Procedure of
Administrative Tribunals, the following questions were asked of
the four hundred attorneys present:
1. Judging from your experience, is it practicable to require
administrative tribunals to adhere to the common law rules
concerning hearsay testimony?
Yes-25; No-24; Not strictly-2.
2. Before what specific administrative tribunals do you believe the common law rules as to hearsay can safely be
relaxed ?
All-8; None-6; Industrial Commissions-5; Public Utilities Commission-5; Tax Commission-3; National Labor
Relations Board-3; Federal Trade Commission-1.
"The answers to the first question were almost equally divided;
one more than half being in favor of relaxing the rule against
hearsay testimony, the other half being in favor of its application.
The bar is not ready as yet to discard the hearsay rule. It is possible that the reason for this reluctance is the conviction that the
personnel of the tribunals is not as yet capable or experienced
enough to determine the proper probative effect that should be
given to hearsay statements. Only eight votes were recorded for
relaxing the hearsay rule for all administrative tribunals. Some
answers indicated that the trouble they experienced was a failure
to apply the same rules of evidence to both parties'46in the case, or
a complete failure to apply any rules of evidence.
In our discussion of this problem, it has been shown that most
of the courts have refused to recognize the fact that Workmen's
Compensation Acts were intended to create an entirely new solution to an age old problem. This solution was to be reached by
"Looking Backward and Forward at Evidence, 50 HARV. L. REV. 909 (1936).
"THAYER,

PRELIMINARY

Brown and Co. (1898).
"24 A.B.A.J. 288 (1938).
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adopting a modern, rational method of procedure with the primary
object of seeking the truth rather than providing a larger playing
field for the practice of technical common law rules of evidence.
However, some progress has been made. In most of the states,
the courts permit the commissions to give probative weight to
hearsay if it is corroborated by some other evidence which would
indicate its trustworthiness. In Virginia and California, the courts
have left the probative value of hearsay in the discretion of the
Commission. Maryland has recognized that in certain cases hearsay may be sufficient to sustain an award.
From a review of the cases, it is clear that, hearsay does in
some instances have definite probative value often times sufficient
to sustain a claim. It would be erroneous to make an all inclusive
statement that hearsay is always incompetent or, on the other hand
that it always has probative weight.
Perhaps the answer lies in a clear, well-defined expression of
legislative intent permitting flexibility on the part of the tribunal
and leaving to their discretion the probative weight to be given
hearsay evidence. And if it is of the type that men of affairs customarily rely on in serious matters, an award based thereon would
be valid and within the requirements of due process.
The success of such a policy would be dependent on the experience and qualifications of the commissioners under the Act,
but in the end, so does justice in a court of law depend largely upon
the qualifications of the judges and attorneys who practice there.

NOTES AND COMMENTS
EVIDENCE: INCOMPETENCY v. INSUFFICIENCY-The recent decision of the Colorado Supreme Court in the case of Wheelock v. Lindner Packing Co.,1 deals with an elusive distinction between incompetency and insufficiency in the law of evidence. The
facts are not complicated. The plaintiffs delivered a shipment of
frozen meat to the carrier for delivery to Ft. Worth. The shipment
was refused by the receiver due to the spoiled condition of the
meat at the point of delivery. The plaintiffs disposed of the meat
at considerable loss and brought this action to recover damages.
The plaintiff established by competent evidence that the meat was
in proper condition upon delivery to the carrier, that the meat was
rejected at the point of delivery, and that it was subsequently sold
at a loss. Under the cases on interstate shipments, a shipper need
only prove that the goods were in proper condition when delivered
to the carrier and spoiled! when received. The burden then rests
upon the defendant carrier.
In the instant case, the plaintiff's only evidence as to the condition of the goods when received was clearly hearsay. This testiI-
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adopting a modern, rational method of procedure with the primary
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mony was not objected to when given, but the fact of its being
hearsay was brought out during cross-examination. At the close
of the plaintiff's case, the defendant moved to dismiss for failure
to prove a cause of action. The trial court ruled that the hearsay
would stand as evidence of the spoiled goods upon receipt. Since
the defendant offered no evidence to show lack of negligence the
judgment was given for the plaintiff.
In reversing the above judgment, the Supreme Court followed
a rule set out in Skinner & Andrews v. Satterfield,2 which held that
for purposes of a motion for directed verdict, a court should entirely disregard hearsay testimony whether objected to or not, and
that the rule applies as well to a motion to dismiss.
The Court held that the plaintiff fell short of proving the cause
for rejection of the goods by the receiver, but in so holding did not
state whether this was due to a lack of evidence entirely or to the
incompetency of the evidence presented. Certainly there was evidence, admittedly hearsay, but nevertheless part of the record due
to an untimely objection. This would appear to mean that hearsay
evidence even though sustained over an untimely objection, was
still incompetent for purposes of ruling on motion's for either a
directed verdict or dismissal. If this case does turn on competency
rather than the sufficiency of the evidence, then the distinction
narrows between this case and other cases holding that incompetent evidence unless objected to may be considered as a basis
for decision. 3
In stating that the plaintiff fell short of proving his cause of
action, the Court must be referring to the sufficiency of the evidence and not to its competency. This rule then would seem to
follow very closely the rule laid down in Hill v. Grosbeck,4 which
held that the failure of a party to object to the admissibility of
evidence does not preclude him from questioning its weight or
sufficiency when admitted to establish a fact in issue.
It would seem then that the Court is saying even though testimony of negligence and improper refrigeration was admitted without timely objection, its hearsay quality renders it insufficient in
weight to establish the facts it states.
J. BELKNAP

CIVIL PROCEDURE: ONLY THOSE PERSONS WHO ARE
NON-RESIDENTS AT THE TIME OF AN ACCIDENT MAY
BE SERVED THROUGH THE SECRETARY OF STATE: William Warwick v. The District Court of the City and County of
Denver, ____
Colo .... ,269 P. 2d 704, 1953-54 C.B.A., Adv. Sh. No. 12
p. 281.
This was an action for damages arising from an automobile
accident which occured March 7, 1951. On July 7, 1952, plaintiff
'121 Colo. 365, 216 P. (2d) 431.
'Woods v. $iegrist, 112 Colo. 257, 149 P. (2d)
29 Colo. 161, 67 P. 167.
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served process upon the Secretary of State in compliance with
section 48, chapter 16, '35 C.S.A., as amended by the Session Laws
of 1937, page 323, sections 1 to 4. Commonly known as the NonResident Motor Vehicle Statute, this statute provides for service
of process upon the Secretary of State, as the true and lawful
agent of any non-resident involved in an accident upon the public
highways of this State. Notice of the suit was given to the defendant in California, and the defendant appeared specially to
contest the validity of the service. In his affidavit the defendant
set forth the following facts: first, at the date of the accident, the
defendant was a resident of the City and County of Denver; second,
that he had moved to Colorado on October 9, 1950 and had remained
here until some time after the date of the accident; third, that his
contract of employment had subsequently terminated; and Fourth,
that he had moved from the state on March 21, 1951, in an effort
to find other employment. He further stated that he had filed both
the federal and state income taxes, giving his residence as Denver,
and that he had obtained both a 1951 automobile license and a 1951
operator's license in Colorado.
On these facts, the Court held: first, defendant was a bona
fide resident at the time of the accident, and, secondly, the Colorado
statute does not apply to that class of persons who are residents
of the State at the time of the accident.
The holding in this case is in accordance with the weight of
authority. In Carlson v. District Court of the City and County of
Denver,' a pastor of a church in Leadville, Colorado, was involved
in an automobile accident. By the time suit was commenced, he had
moved to New York. Taking judicial notice that pastors of necessity are moved about the country, the Court quashed the service
upon the Secretary of State. Where the person is not a nonresident at the time of the accident, service may not be had upon
him by means of the Colorado statute.
It was contended in Suit v. Shailer 2 that the term "non-resident" in a similar Maryland statute 3 referred to persons who were
non-residents at the time of the service of process. To this contention, the court replied, "... it was not the intention of the Maryland
Legislature to authorize this special form of substituted service on
defendants who were bona fide residents of the State at the time
of the occurrence, but who' '4afterwards changed their residence to
some other State or place.
Several cases involve military personnel who were stationed
in the State at the time of the accident, but who had been transferred by the time service of process was attempted. Uniformly,
the courts have held that, while the service men may have retained
their domicile in their home State, they were bona fide residents
' 116 Colo. 330, 180 P. (2d) 525 (1947).
'18 F. Supp. 568 (D. C. Md. 1937).
Flack's Supp. to the Ann. Code of Md., Art. 56, §190 A.
'Also, nc-te Wood v. White, 68 App. D. C. 341, 97 F. (2d)

646 (1938).
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of the State where the accident occurred. Therefore,
the statute
5
providing for substituted service was inapplicable.
Perhaps the most striking decision is Northwestern Mortgage
and Security Co. v. Noel Construction Co." One Carter intended to
abandon his residence in North Dakota. Without having made a
choice of new residence, he started on a visit to Minnesota. While
traveling in North Dakota, he was involved in an accident. After repairing his automobile, he continued his trip, never returning to
North Dakota, and finally taking up residence in the State of Washington. The North Dakota court held that Carter's residence at the
time of the accident was in North Dakota since he had not arrived
at his new residence. Therefore, jurisdiction over him could not be
gained 7by means of substituted service under the North Dakota
statute.
While not so extreme as the Northwestern case, other courts
have followed the general rule of these decisions.8
The only case which could be found which deviated from the
preceding decisions was State ex rel. Thompson v. District Court
of the Fourth Judicial District in and for Missoula County.9 This
statute differed from Colorado's in that it applied to "any person
who operates,"'10 and the court interpreted this to include those
who were residents at the time of the accident, but who subsequently became non-residents.
Under the majority of the present statutes, while it is possible
to obtain jurisdiction over present residents, and those who use
the public highways but who were never residents, it is not possible
to gain jurisdiction over one-time residents who move from the
state after an accident, but before start of suit.
Ten states 1have cured this defect in their statutes by making
their statutes specifically applicable to both non-residents, and to
residents who leave the State after an accident. 12 While the United
States Supreme Court has yet to decide the constitutionality of
these statutes, several state courts have held them valid. 13 Moreover, the basis for holding the statutes valid in cases of non-residents, i.e., the states' authority to regulate travel on public high5Berger v. Superior Court in and for Yuba County, 79 Cal. App. (2d) 425,
179 P. (2d) 600 (1947); Suit v. Shailer, si pra.
71 N. D. 256, 300 N. W. 28 (1941).
'North Dakota has since amended its statute to include such a class of
persons. See 1951 Session Laws of the State of N. D., section 28-0611, as amended
by 1953 Laws of N. D., chapter 204.
Welsh v. Ruopp, 228 Iowa 70, 289 N. W. 760 (1940); Mann v. Humphrey's
Adm'x, 257 Ky. 647, 79 S. W. (2d) 17 (1935).
'108 Mont. 362, 91 P. (2d) 422 (1939).
10 Revised Code of Mont.,
1947, Title 53, chapter 2, sections 201-206.
" Illinois, Iowa, Maryland, Minnesota, New York, North Dakota, Ohio, Oregon, Pennsylvania, and Virginia.
"Compare Ill. Rev. Stat., 1949, chapter 95%, section 22, with Minn. Stat.,
1945, section 170.55 (c), as amended by Laws of Minn., 1949, chapter 582.
"State ex rel. Thompson v. District Court of the Fourth Judicial District
in and for Missoula County, supra; Hendershot v. Ferkel, 140 0. St. 112, 56 N.
E. (2d) 205 (1944); Joseph Palozzolo'v. Harold J. MCord, 7 Ohio Op. 159 (1936).
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ways, 14 can with equal validity be applied to residents."'
It is submitted that in light of the decision in the principal
case, a similar amendment to Colorado's Non-Resident Motor
Vehicle Statute is needed to assure the residents of Colorado, damaged in automobile accidents, an opportunity to have their day in
the courts of their own jurisdiction.
JOHN CRISWELL
v. Maryland, 235 U. S. 610 (1915) ; Kane v. New Jersey, 242
274 U. S. 352 (1927).
U. S. 160 (1916); Hess v. Pawloski,
13.
15Hendershot v. Ferkel, supra, note
14 Hendrikick
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